Open Markets or a Few Powerful Gatekeepers?

Part 54 of 60 · Series date: September 7, 2026

A good invention can reach the Moon and still be unable to reach its customer. In this future scenario, a small team has a useful tool and a buyer, but only one company offers the power connection it needs.

The price is high. The terms are unclear. Changing to a rival would mean rebuilding the tool.

A market can be full of promise and still be hard to enter.

Early lunar work may depend on just a few firms. Rockets, power systems, and relays cost a great deal to build. With few buyers, there may not be enough work to support many rivals. That does not make the first provider a villain. It does mean access needs care.

The Artemis Accords support openness about plans, systems that can work together, and efforts to avoid harmful interference. These are useful goals. They do not settle all disputes over prices, contracts, or who may use a service. NASA’s Artemis Accords overview.

Start with the plug. If two power firms use a shared, tested connection, a buyer may have a real choice. If each uses a private design, changing firms can cost more than the saving. Standards can help, but the people who write them should hear from new users as well as the first builders.

Next, look at the bill. A low price for access may hide fees for support, special gear, or a late change. The buyer needs the full cost and a clear account of what happens if the service fails.

Public funds may help build the first network. In return, a contract could set fair rules for access. It should also leave the provider enough income to keep the service working. A cheap network that cannot pay for repairs helps nobody for long.

Data can be a gate too. A map, a safety record, or a description of a connection may be needed before a new team can work. Some records need protection. Others may serve the public best when shared. The line should be explained.

Sites create harder choices. Teams need room to work safely, and one activity can affect another. That calls for notice, planning, and sound rules. A safety plan should not be treated as a deed to lunar land.

There is a cost when access fails. A small science team may cancel a useful test. A supplier may give up on a better part. The base loses work that could have helped both its users and the wider public.

There is also a cost when rules are too weak. One careless user can damage shared gear or spoil another team’s work. Open access works best when users know their duties and follow them.

In our future scene, the small team receives a clear guide to the network. It can compare two service plans and choose one it can afford. Its test goes ahead.

A fair door still needs a lock

The small team in our scenario should have a clear path into the network. It should also meet the technical and safety requirements that protect other users. Fair access does not mean that every proposed connection must be accepted without review.

The important questions are whether the requirements serve a legitimate purpose, whether they are explained, and whether comparable users face comparable terms. A rule that protects equipment is different from a rule designed mainly to keep a competitor out.

A provider may need to refuse a request that exceeds its capacity. It should be able to show why. Published service descriptions and a clear review process can make such decisions easier to understand and challenge where appropriate.

The cost of leaving matters

Imagine that a customer wants to change networks. Its instrument uses a unique interface, its records are stored in a difficult format, and the current provider controls the information needed for migration. The customer may remain even when another service offers better terms.

This is a form of dependence that can arise without an explicit ban on competition. Early design choices can shape the market for years. Compatible interfaces and usable records can preserve options, though standardization itself requires careful technical work.

The goal is not to require every provider to be identical. Companies can compete through quality, support, reliability, and specialized features. Common foundations can make that competition more meaningful by reducing the cost of changing providers.

The first builder and the next newcomer both matter

A company that builds scarce infrastructure takes real risks. If access rules prevent it from covering costs, the system may never be built or properly maintained. If the rules allow unchecked control over essential services, later users may face excessive barriers.

Publicly supported infrastructure offers an opportunity to define that balance early through the terms of support. Those terms should be practical, transparent, and suited to the actual service. They should not assume that a small lunar market can sustain unlimited competing networks from the beginning.

The test of openness is therefore concrete. Can a new user understand the requirements, obtain necessary information, and receive a fair assessment? Can it compare the full price and responsibilities? Is there a way to resolve a dispute without losing access to every essential service?

For Earth researchers and small businesses, these details could determine whether the Moon is a usable destination. An affordable instrument is of little value if connecting it requires an opaque negotiation with a single gatekeeper.

A strong lunar economy would reward the firms that make useful services possible while preserving room for others to improve them. The benefit is more than lower prices. It is a place where a good idea has a realistic chance to become useful work.

That is how to judge openness: Can a new group understand the rules, meet the needs, and do useful work? The first builders deserve a fair return. The next builders need a fair chance.

A lunar economy will grow stronger when good ideas can reach the tools they need.

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